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Using unique new data, we examine whether brokerage trading volume creates a conflict of interest 
for analysts. We find that earnings forecast optimism is associated with higher brokerage volume, 
even controlling for forecast and analyst quality, recommendations, and target prices. However 
forecast accuracy is also significantly associated with higher volume. When analysts change 
brokerage firms, they bring trading volume with them, influencing trading volume at the new 
brokerage house. This indicates that analysts drive the volume effects we observe. Consistent with 
a reward for generating volume, brokerage houses are less likely to demote analysts who generate 
more volume. Finally, analysts strategically adjust forecast optimism based on expected volume 
impact. Analysts become more (less) optimistic if their optimistic forecasts in the prior year were 
more (less) successful at generating volume. However, consistent with higher costs to increasing 
accuracy, analysts do not update accuracy based on expected volume impact. Overall, our results 
are consistent with a brokerage trading volume conflict of interest moving analysts towards more 
optimistic earnings forecasts, despite the volume reward for accuracy. 
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1. Introduction 
Sell-side security analysts play a significant role in financial markets. They provide 
research and investment advice to institutional and retail investors, and they contribute to firms’ 
information environment.1 However, sell-side analysts face conflicts of interest that may cause 
them to bias their research output. We focus on the potential biasing of one of analysts’ most salient 
research outputs: earnings forecasts. Historically, sell-side analyst research has been funded 
mainly through investment banking and through brokerage commissions (Cowen, Groysberg, and 
Healy, 2006). Numerous studies have documented the conflicts of interest caused by investment 
banking relationships,2 yet few of these studies address conflicts related to commissions.3 Prior 
literature has provided evidence that, across brokerage houses, more optimistic recommendations 
are associated with higher trading volume (see discussion of prior literature in Section 2). Whether 
this creates a conflict of interest for analysts, and whether and how this extends to earnings 
forecasts, is unclear.  
Understanding the potential commissions-related conflict of interest is of particular 
importance given changes to the analyst research funding model. Several new rules and regulations 
established in the early 2000s attempted to address conflicts of interest related to investment 
                                                 
1 See Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010); Bradshaw (2011); and Kothari, So, and Verdi (2016) for reviews of the 
literature on sell-side analysts, and Bradshaw, Ertimur and O’Brien (2017) for a more complete discussion of the 
history and current institutional context in which sell-side analysts operate and their role in financial markets. See also 
Chen, Cheng, and Lo (2010); Li and You (2015); Amiram, Owens, and Rozenbaum (2016); and Huang, Lehavy, Zang, 
and Zheng (2016) for more recent evidence on the roles of analysts in information discovery and interpretation.  
2 For research on conflicts of interest related to investment banking relationships, see, for example, Dugar and Nathan 
(1995); Lin and McNichols (1998); Michaely and Womack (1999); Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (2000); and Barber, 
Lehavy, and Trueman (2007) for evidence on the relative optimism of investment banking–affiliated analysts versus 
unaffiliated analysts. 
3 Firth, Lin, Liu, and Xuan (2013); and Gu, Li, and Yang (2013) discuss the relative lack of research on conflicts of 
interest related to trading commissions. Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2011) suggest that there is evidence that 
trading commissions play a significant role in optimistic recommendations but not in optimistic earnings forecasts. 
The primary papers examining whether analyst optimism is related to trading volume are Jackson (2005) and Irvine 
(2004). These papers are discussed in more detail in Section 2.2. 
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banking. In particular, these new rules included NASD Rule 2711, NYSE Rule 472, and the Global 
Analyst Research Settlement. These rules aimed to separate investment banking from research, 
thus lowering the probability that brokers bias sell-side analyst research to gain investment banking 
business. Research suggests that these regulations mitigated the investment banking conflict of 
interest (Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach, 2009; Corwin, Larocque, and Stegemoller, 2017). 
As a result, these changes may have increased the importance of brokerage commissions, since 
they are the primary remaining source of funding.4 On the other hand, “unbundling” of brokerage 
commissions from payment of research in Europe, as required by MiFID II, may decrease the 
impact of trading volume-related incentives on analyst behavior.5 The SEC is still considering 
what permanent changes will be made in the United States (US) in response.6 
In this study, we exploit new trading volume data at the brokerage house–stock–day level, 
for brokerage houses operating in the US,7 to test for conflicts of interest derived from analysts’ 
incentive to increase trading volume. We collect brokerage volume data for S&P 1500 firms and 
for 18 major brokerage houses over the 5-year period of 2011–2015, and we focus on the analyst’s 
impact on the broker’s share of trading volume in a given stock. We begin by extending prior 
research by examining whether more optimistic analyst earnings forecasts are associated with a 
larger share of trading volume for the analyst’s brokerage house when the forecasts are released. 
However, even for recommendations, prior research has not established whether a positive 
                                                 
4 Call, Sharp, and Wong (2019) find that enforcement of these and other rules by FINRA helps to mitigate the effects 
of several types of conflicts of interest on analyst research. However, currently FINRA monitoring does not include 
the type of trading-related conflict of interest we examine in this paper. 
5  For more information on MiFID II, its different provisions, and implementation guidance, see the European 
Securities and Markets Authority page on MiFID II, https://www.esma.europa.eu/policy-rules/mifid-ii-and-mifir. 
6 On November 4, 2019, the SEC issued a press release that extends a no-action letter to market participants in regards 
to MiFID II as they evaluate the effects of the regulation (see https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-229). 
7 We obtain data from Bloomberg Terminal. The data are described in detail in Section 3.  
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optimism-volume relation leads to a conflict of interest. The remainder of our paper focuses on 
unique new tests to better address the potential conflict of interest. Our results are consistent with 
trading volume creating a conflict of interest for analyst earnings forecasts. 
Trading volume is likely to be increasing in analyst optimism in the short run due to short-
sale costs. If investors reward a brokerage house which publishes relevant analyst research by 
trading through them, then that brokerage house’s share of trading volume will also increase with 
analyst optimism. This relation could break down for two reasons.  First, it is not clear whether 
investors will reward an analyst’s brokerage firm with an increased share of trading volume 
immediately surrounding that analyst’s research. They may trade through their normal brokerage 
houses, leaving the brokerage share of volume unchanged. Second, in the long run, investors may 
learn not to respond to analysts who are consistently biased and may instead respond more strongly 
to high-quality analysts. Institutional investors allocate commissions based, at least partly, on their 
evaluations of the usefulness of various analysts’ research (see Groysberg and Healy, 2013, for an 
overview of relevant evidence). Industry participants argue that they use commissions to pay for 
high-quality analyst service (Greenwich Associates, 2015). Thus, analysts will trade off incentives 
to generate volume through optimistic bias with incentives to generate volume through quality.  
The first step in examining the potential trading-volume conflict of interest is to examine 
whether optimistic earnings forecasts yield a higher share of volume for the analyst’s brokerage 
house. Prior research has documented a correlation between analyst coverage characteristics and 
brokerage trading volume (e.g., Irvine, 2000; Irvine, 2004; Jackson, 2005; Cowen, Groysberg, and 
Healy, 2006; Agarwal and Chen, 2012; Grant, Jarnecic, and Su, 2015). Our first set of tests extends 
these prior papers. We find strong and consistent evidence that more positive forecasts (measured 
 4 
 
relative to other analysts’ forecasts) increase the brokerage house’s share of trading volume in the 
days around the forecast’s publication. 
We also find that several dimensions of earnings forecast quality and analyst quality 
increase trading volume. Specifically, the ex post accuracy of a specific earnings forecast and how 
early in the year the given forecast is issued (used in prior literature as a proxy for information 
content, see, e.g., Clement and Tse, 2003) are positively associated with the broker’s share of 
trading volume. The analyst’s prior-year forecast accuracy and firm-specific forecasting 
experience are also associated with a trading volume increment. Thus, based purely upon the 
analyst-coverage – volume relation, it is not clear whether the incentive to generate trading 
commissions will drive analysts to be more optimistic or to issue higher quality earnings forecasts.  
The economic magnitudes of the given effects are significant. An interquartile-range 
increase in earnings forecast optimistic bias increases brokerage house share of trading volume by 
1.1% of the mean, controlling for forecast and analyst quality effects. An interquartile-range 
increase in forecast accuracy is associated with an increase in volume share of 1.3% of the mean. 
Finally, an interquartile range increase in prior-year earnings forecast accuracy is associated with 
a 2.2% current-year increase in trading volume, relative to the mean, around earnings forecasts. 
Thus, increases in forecast optimistic bias and forecast quality both have economically large 
impacts on trading volume. Analyst behavior must then weigh the costs and benefits of each. For 
example, it is likely to require less effort to increase optimistic bias than to increase ex-post 
accuracy. However, forecast bias may damage an analyst’s future reputation.   
Having confirmed the potential conflict of interest, we conduct three additional analyses 
to address whether a push for volume generation induces a conflict of interest. First, we examine 
analyst moves to determine whether analysts have a causal effect on the brokerage share of trading 
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volume. We find that when an analyst switches brokerage firms, the new brokerage house’s share 
of trading volume around the analyst’s coverage of the given stock is positively related to the 
volume the analyst generated at her prior brokerage house. In other words, if the analyst generated 
more volume at her old brokerage house, she does so at her new one as well. This suggests that 
analysts have a causal impact on the share of trading volume, and brokerage houses are likely to 
consider trading volume generation as a transferrable analyst skill. 
Second, we examine analysts’ career progress to observe more directly whether brokerage 
firms reward or penalize analysts for volume generation. We examine whether the volume share 
associated with a given analyst’s research in a given year is associated with that analyst’s career 
changes in the subsequent year. Since the 18 brokerage houses in our sample are all relatively large 
and high status, we focus on demotion, defined as moving to a smaller or lower-status brokerage 
house. We find that analysts who generate lower volume are significantly more likely to be 
demoted in the subsequent year. Thus, analysts face a strong incentive to generate trading volume. 
Finally, we examine whether analysts strategically update the optimistic bias of their 
forecasts and/or the accuracy of their forecasts, with the goal of generating volume. If analysts are 
strategic about this bias, versus being honestly optimistic, we should find that analysts strategically 
update their biasing behavior. If a strategic analyst is more (less) successful in generating trading 
volume with more optimistic forecasts, then he or she should be more (less) likely to issue 
optimistically biased forecasts in the future. We find that optimism is increasing in prior-year 
optimism–volume sensitivity. This provides evidence that analysts strategically update their 
forecast optimism— i.e., they are more optimistic when their past experience suggests that 
optimism will increase their broker’s share of volume. However the same would be true if analysts 
strategically update their accuracy to generate volume. We do not find that accuracy is increasing 
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in prior-year accuracy–volume sensitivity. This is consistent with the additional resources and 
effort required to become more accurate in the subsequent year being too high for analysts to 
update accuracy. Our results do not preclude analysts improving accuracy over a longer time 
period, but they suggest that at least on the one-to-two year horizon, analysts are more likely to 
strategically update optimism than accuracy.  
Ultimately, proving that an analyst is being influenced by a conflict of interest is almost 
impossible. Analysts’ internal motivations are unobservable. Despite a large literature on 
investment banking conflicts of interest, the literature has had difficulty establishing whether 
underwriting analysts intentionally bias their research upwards, or whether firms simply choose 
underwriters whose analysts are optimistic about them (see, e.g., the discussion in Bradshaw 2011 
and Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2014). However, understanding potential conflicts of interest 
is of vital importance.  The existing literature on broker trading volume has described the 
relationship between optimism and trading volume. We take the first meaningful step in 
establishing that a resulting conflict of interest affects analyst behavior.  
Our study contributes significantly to the literature on sell-side analysts by addressing one 
of the major potential conflicts of interest that analysts face. In the current analyst funding model, 
brokerage commissions affect almost all sell-side analysts. Thus, it is especially important to 
understand commission-related incentives. This contribution is particularly relevant due to the 
implementation of the revamped Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) in Europe, 
which requires that asset managers pay for sell-side research directly, and not through trading 
commissions (Financial Conduct Authority, 2017). All brokerages that distribute research to 
European clients fall under the new regulation (see, e.g., Engler, 2017). In this paper, we show that 
trading commissions currently reward analyst research for both optimism and quality. It is unclear 
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what effects MiFID II will have. On the one hand, institutional investors argue that direct 
payments, with clearly defined fee structures, will not allow them to reward quality in the same 
way that the current structure allows (Greenwich Associates, 2015). On the other hand, analysts 
will have less motivation to bias their research optimistically if trading commissions are reduced.  
Our study also contributes to the open question of why analyst earnings forecasts are 
optimistically biased. It has long been observed that earnings forecasts, excluding those just before 
the earnings announcement, are overly optimistic (O’Brien, 1988). Yet, current literature does not 
provide a satisfactory explanation for this observed pattern, given weak and sometimes conflicting 
results across studies (see Beyer et al., 2010; and Bradshaw, 2011, for surveys of explanations and 
existing evidence). Hong and Kubik (2003) show that analysts are rewarded for forecast optimism 
with career advancement, controlling for accuracy, but it is unclear why brokerage houses value 
optimism. Our results suggest that forecast optimism leads to a larger brokerage share of trading 
volume and thus provides an explanation for (US) brokers’ preference for optimistic forecasts.  
Overall, our results are relevant for researchers, regulators, and investors. Our results show 
evidence of a conflict of interest based on trading volume: an incentive to upwardly bias research. 
Optimism has a significant effect, despite a brokerage-volume reward for quality. Evidence of 
analysts becoming more or less optimistic based on past success in generating trading volume 
suggests that analysts are aware of this, and they are—at least in part—strategically optimistic.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background 
information, including relevant institutional details, theory, and empirical evidence, and develops 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and the sample used in this study. Section 4 presents 




2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Analyst Incentives and Institutional Details 
In practice, sell-side analyst research is primarily funded indirectly through revenues 
brought in by other activities of the brokerage house. While some research, particularly that of 
stand-alone research companies, is funded through direct payments for research, the two primary 
sources of funding for research in the US have been investment banking and brokerage. However, 
in the wake of several scandals, most notably the trial of Merrill Lynch analyst Henry Blodget, 
NASD Rule 2711 and the amended NYSE Rule 472, effective in 2002, required virtually all 
investment banks that provided sell-side analyst services to cut the ties between investment 
banking and analysts. These regulations limited communication between the two departments, and 
analysts could not be compensated based on specific investment banking business. The terms of 
the Global Analyst Research Settlement between the SEC, NYSE, NASD, the New York Attorney 
General, and 12 investment banks (published in December of 2002) required additional separation 
for the affected banks. These regulations likely reduced the investment banking component of 
analysts’ compensation, increasing the relative importance of brokerage trading commissions. 
Brokerage houses can increase their share of overall market trading volume in one of two 
ways. The first method is directly inducing customers to trade, for example, through broker calls 
to customers with updated investment advice. Anecdotally, this appears to be a primary method of 
generating trading volume with retail investment clients and smaller portfolio managers. The 
second method is providing a high level of service to larger institutional clients who then allocate 
more of their trading to the bank as a form of compensation. This is typically done through “broker 
votes,” in which buy-side clients evaluate brokerage houses quarterly, semiannually, or annually, 
for the services they have provided—including analyst coverage. The resulting votes are used by 
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the trading desk in the subsequent period to allocate trades across brokers (Greenwich Associates, 
2015).  
While analysts potentially play an important role in both methods of increasing brokerage 
trading commissions, their effect on broker votes is likely to be harder to measure. The lag between 
analyst coverage and the trade allocated to the brokerage house is likely to range from less than a 
quarter to over a year. The trade allocated in the subsequent period to the analyst’s brokerage house 
could also be for any stock, not just the ones that the given analyst covered. In addition, since 
broker votes aggregate the evaluation of all the broker’s analysts and other services, the effect of 
a given analyst’s research becomes harder to measure.  
In contrast, the effect of analyst research on inducement of trade (e.g., through brokerage 
calls) is much more direct. Consider the following example: An analyst issues an earnings forecast. 
The brokerage house’s brokers call clients to relay this investment advice, and a subset of those 
investors trade. As a result, there is an increase in the recommending analyst’s broker’s share of 
trading volume for that stock. In our study, we focus on this aspect of trade: the immediate increase 
in a broker’s share of trading volume around that broker’s analyst research.8,9 
Evidence on analyst compensation supports the premise that analysts are rewarded for 
generating trading volume and, in turn, for generating commissions. Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy 
(2006) state that brokerage houses without investment banking arms “… usually reward their 
                                                 
8 Our research design may fail to capture the full effects of analyst research on brokerage share of trading volume, and 
the impacts of brokerage-volume incentives on analysts’ careers and behavior. However by using a shorter window, 
focusing on the period during which we expect the research-volume relation to be strongest, we minimize noise and 
increase our power to detect a direct relation between analyst research and volume.  
9 The investors responding to broker calls could be retail or institutional investors. Retail investors may be unlikely to 
trade through multiple brokerage firms. If an individual retail investor has a TD Ameritrade account, for example, and 
sees that a Morgan Stanley analyst updated their recommendation, they are most likely to trade through their TD 
Ameritrade account. However, retail investors may trade more often when prompted by their brokerage firm to do so. 
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research analysts using a single measure of performance: trading volume in the stocks they cover” 
(p. 125). According to analysts surveyed in Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp (2015), an analyst’s 
“standing in analyst rankings or broker votes” is one of the most important factors that affects 
compensation (p. 25). Forty-four percent describe “success at generating underwriting business or 
trading commissions” as “Very Important” to compensation (Table 8, p. 28).  
2.2 The Potential for Bias 
The literature has extensively examined the risk of investment banking conflicts of interest 
among equity analysts (see Beyer et al., 2010, and Bradshaw, 2011, for reviews of the literature). 
While the investment banking conflict of interest has garnered much attention, the actual 
occurrence of these conflicts is infrequent. For example, Hong and Kubik (2003) report that in 
their sample, only 3% of an analyst’s portfolio consists of stocks that have an underwriting 
relationship with the analyst’s brokerage house. These infrequent conflicts leave open the question 
of why earnings forecasts and stock recommendations are optimistically biased (Beyer et al., 2010, 
p. 333). Theory and intuition suggest that the incentive to generate trading volume and brokerage 
commissions for the brokerage house may account for part of this optimistic bias. 
Beyer and Guttman (2011) develop a model in which, if analysts are rewarded based on 
trading volume in the stocks they cover, analysts bias their forecasts upwards, on average. In their 
model, investors are risk averse, with informed and uninformed strategic investors and noise 
traders interacting in the market. This leads to more trade for positive information than for negative 
information, with the exception of extremely negative news, and thus leads to the analyst’s 
strategic biasing of research. While their model predicts that analysts will bias extremely negative 
news downwards, it predicts that they more frequently bias positive news upwards, leading to an 
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average optimistic bias to generate trade. In reality, many investors face short sale constraints, or 
at least significant costs for short selling, which would further increase the asymmetry between 
trade generated by positive analyst research versus negative analyst research. Beyer and Guttman 
(2011) establish theoretically that positively biased research can generate incremental trading 
volume even with utility-maximizing investors, and biasing forecasts can be an optimal strategy 
for analysts even when they face reputational costs.10  
However, investors can learn over time whether an analyst tends to bias her research 
upwards. Beyer and Guttman (2011) model a game in which the analyst issues a single forecast, 
precluding reputation building. In reality, repeated-game reputational effects might lead to a lower 
investor volume reaction to an analyst’s future research if they bias their forecasts more heavily. 
This would deter analysts from biasing their research and would provide an incentive for quality.  
It is particularly unclear whether analysts would be willing to bias earnings forecasts 
upwards relative to their willingness to bias buy/sell recommendations, given three institutional 
details. First, earnings forecasts are associated with clear ex post earnings realizations, which 
makes it evident when a forecast has low accuracy. In contrast, recommendations are not 
associated with a specific investment horizon, and it can be difficult to determine the correct risk 
adjustment when evaluating a raw return, which in turn makes it more difficult to evaluate the 
quality of a recommendation ex post. 
Second, retail investors react more strongly to recommendations, while institutional 
investors react more strongly to earnings forecasts (Mikhail, Walther, and Willis, 2007; 
                                                 
10 Hayes (1998) also models the impact of trading commissions on analyst behavior, assuming that the analyst reports 
truthfully. The analyst then chooses to allocate more effort to covering stocks for which positive information is likely. 
The end result is that the analyst is optimistic, on average, due to bias in coverage decisions and effort allocation. 
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Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2014). Institutional investors are more likely to be aware of analyst 
biases (Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2007, 2014; Mikhail, Walther, and Willis, 2007), and they 
have a more direct impact on analysts’ careers and reputations (e.g., institutional investors 
determine rankings such as Institutional Investor magazine’s All Star Analysts). This increases the 
costs of biasing forecasts. 
Third, analysts face a countervailing pressure from the management of covered firms to 
bias earnings forecasts downwards, making them easier to “meet or beat.” As a result, analysts are 
more likely to issue lower earnings forecasts near the time of an earnings announcement, which 
generates a “walk-down” pattern in earnings announcements (Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki, 
2004). Analysts are also more likely to issue lower earnings forecasts when they face an investment 
banking pressure, even while they issue more positive recommendations (Baik and Yi, 2007; 
Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2014), and to have a similar divergence in behavior when initiating 
coverage with strong buy recommendations (Ertimur, Muslu, and Zhang, 2011).  
Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether optimistic or high-quality forecasts increase 
the share of trading volume that is channeled through an analyst’s brokerage house. It is also an 
empirical question as to what effects these incentives have on analyst earnings forecasts.  
2.3 Prior Empirical Evidence 
There is empirical evidence that the incentive to generate trading volume is a factor in 
driving positive stock recommendations; however, the results for earnings forecasts are mixed, 
with no clear evidence that trading-volume incentives drive optimistic forecasts (Beyer et al., 2010, 
p. 133). Irvine (2004), using 1993–1994 Toronto Stock Exchange data, finds that buy (sell) 
recommendations are (are not) positively associated with trading volume. However, more 
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positive/optimistic forecasts fail to generate additional trading volume. Jackson (2005), using 10 
years of Australian data, shows that annual brokerage share of trading volume is increasing in the 
prior-year survey-based ranking of the analyst covering the stock, and in the analyst’s current-year 
average recommendation level. However, Jackson (2005) finds mixed results for earnings 
forecasts, with no positive relation between 1-year-ahead forecast optimism and volume, after 
controlling for analyst quality. Grant and Jarnecic (2015) also use Australian data, and find a 
positive relation between the monthly brokerage share of trading volume and top 20% forecast 
optimism, but do not control for quality. Juergens and Lindsey (2009) and Neihaus and Zhang 
(2010) use Nasdaq data, but focus exclusively on recommendations.11,12 
Overall, these studies fail to find evidence that optimistic earnings forecasts drive 
additional brokerage share of trading volume, after controlling for analyst quality. However these 
papers largely use non-US and/or pre–Global Settlement data. The US Setting differs from Canada 
                                                 
11 Juergens and Lindsey (2009) find increased trading for recommendation upgrades and downgrades, suggesting 
indirectly that trading volume does not incentivize upward bias in recommendation levels. Neihaus and Zhang (2010) 
find a higher broker share of trading in the months in which analysts issue above-median recommendations, with 
increases in trading for both upgrades and downgrades. 
12 Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006) and Agarwal and Chen (2012) take a cross-brokerage approach to examining 
the impact of brokerage trading volume incentives on analyst research. Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006) show 
that brokerage houses that lack an underwriting business (and thus presumably rely more on brokerage business) issue 
more optimistic earnings forecasts and recommendations. However, Agarwal and Chen (2012) directly measure the 
revenue breakdown for brokerage houses, and find no evidence that quarterly earnings forecasts are more optimistic 
for brokerage houses that depend more on brokerage business as a source of revenue. Firth, Lin, Liu and Xuan (2013) 
and Gu, Li, and Yang (2013), using Chinese data, find evidence consistent with analysts issuing more optimistic 
recommendations for stocks owned by mutual funds which pay the brokerage firm higher fees. Our focus is on trade-
generation: whether more optimistic (or higher quality) analyst research output, such as recommendations and 
earnings forecasts, generate higher trade for the brokerage house.  
 14 
 
and Australia in important ways. 13  It is not clear that findings regarding analyst behavior 
documented in one of these countries extend to the others.14  
Overall, the evidence from these papers is highly mixed. Most importantly, there is no clear 
evidence (1) that optimistic analyst earnings forecasts bring in a larger broker share of volume, 
particularly when controlling for forecast and analyst quality; (2) whether analysts’ careers are 
impacted by their volume generation; and (3) whether analysts modify their behavior due to the 
volume-generation incentive.  
Ultimately, prior evidence is mixed as to whether analyst earnings forecast optimism is 
associated with higher brokerage trading volume, and does not directly address whether optimism-
volume relations create a conflict of interest, for either recommendations or forecasts.  
2.4 Hypotheses 
Based on the theory and evidence described in Sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, we state two sets 
of formal hypotheses, in alternative form.  
                                                 
13 Canada and Australia both have smaller financial markets, in terms of number of stocks actively traded, the market 
value of publicly traded stocks, and the number of analysts covering stocks. As of March 29, 2019, the market value 
of Canadian (Australian) publicly listed stocks was USD 2.4 (1.5) trillion, while the market value of US publicly 
traded stocks was USD 32.1 trillion (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?). The research 
industry is also smaller in Australia and Canada than in the US. I/B/E/S reports 10% (20%) as many earnings forecasts 
in Australia (Canada) as in the US over the 20 years from 1995 through 2014. Based upon I/B/E/S data, the average 
covered stock in the US has 25% higher analyst coverage than the average covered stock in Australia or Canada. In 
addition, both the Canadian and Australian stock markets are dominated by financial services and commodities-based 
industries (e.g., mining, oil and gas, other commodities) (https://www.tsx.com and https://www.asx.com/au, accessed 
March 2019). Earnings predictability is likely to be very different for financial services and commodities-based 
industries than most others.  
14 Using several different measures, Habib and Hossain (2008) fail to find evidence of “meet or beat” earnings 
management. Thus, one of the key incentives that differentiate earnings forecasts from recommendations in the US is 
less likely to be present in Australia. The role of the Global Settlement is also extremely important when examining 
broker-volume incentives. Some countries responded to the Global Settlement with changes in analyst behavior that 
were similar to the US, but Canadian and Australian analysts did not significantly change their behavior (Hovakimian 
and Saenyasiri, 2014). This suggests that the incentives for analysts in Canada and Australia differ from the incentives 
for analysts in the US. While the exact differences in incentives are unclear from the extant literature, it is clear that 
there are important differences. 
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First, extending prior research, we expect that more optimistic earnings forecasts will lead 
to higher trading volume for the analyst’s brokerage house around the issuance of that estimate: 
H1a. More optimistic analyst earnings forecasts will lead to a larger brokerage share 
of trading volume for the analyst’s brokerage house.  
 
We also expect that higher-quality forecasts and forecasts from higher-quality analysts will lead 
to higher trading volume. We examine this directly, testing the following two hypotheses:  
H1b. Higher-quality forecasts will lead to a larger brokerage share of trading volume 
for the analysts’ brokerage house.  
H1c. The forecasts of higher-quality analysts will lead to a larger brokerage share of 
trading volume for the analysts’ brokerage house.  
 
Finally, we jointly examine the effects of optimism, forecast quality, and analyst quality. It is an 
empirical question whether any one of these categories dominates.  
Our second set of hypotheses addresses conflict of interest more directly. Assuming that 
optimistic forecasts are associated with a larger broker share of trading volume, the next question 
is whether the analyst drives the incremental volume. If the analyst is generating trading volume, 
then when she moves to another brokerage houses, we should find that the volume response at the 
new brokerage house changes. In particular:  
H2a. When an analyst switches brokerage firms, the new brokerage house’s share of 
trading volume around analyst coverage of the given stock is positively related to 
the volume the analyst generated at her prior brokerage house.  
 
We examine analyst incentives more directly by examining career progression, testing:  
H2b. Analysts who fail to generate brokerage trading volume are more likely to move 
to lower-tier brokerage houses.  
 
Finally, we examine whether analysts strategically bias their earnings forecasts, or 
strategically improve accuracy, to generate trading volume. Intuitively, an analyst will choose a 
level of optimism which increases trading volume but minimizes costs such as reduced reputation. 
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However, an analyst will not automatically know what the optimal level of optimism is. They will 
learn from experience whether to increase or decrease their level of optimism.  We design a test to 
examine whether analysts consider trading volume generation when updating their level of 
optimism. If Analyst A is more successful at generating trading volume with optimistic forecasts 
than expected in one year, we would expect that Analyst A will place a heavier weight on optimism 
in trading off the expected volume generation effects of optimism and the quality and reputation 
costs of optimistic bias in the subsequent year, and will thus increase optimism in the subsequent 
year.15 Similarly, analysts will trade off the costs of more accurate forecasts – additional time, 
effort, research, and use of resources – with the potential benefits. We similarly examine whether 
an analyst’s experience with the volume-generation benefit of accuracy affects their subsequent 
accuracy. We hypothesize: 
H2c. An analyst’s earnings forecast optimism (accuracy) is positively related to the 
volume she generated through earnings forecast optimism (accuracy) in the prior 
year.  
 
3. Data and Sample 
We obtain trading volume data from the Bloomberg Terminal database. The Terminal 
provides information on the total number of shares traded for each stock–day–broker, which 
satisfies certain data selection criteria over a 5-year period. However, the format requires manual 
downloading for specified stock–broker pairs. We focus on S&P 1500 firms and select a sample 
of 18 brokerage houses that have a matching broker code in the Bloomberg Terminal and produce 
                                                 
15 This learning and updating does not imply that analysts will become successively more optimistic over time. Instead, 
it suggests that analysts are learning over time what the “optimal” level of optimism is for themselves. This optimum 
may also change as their experience and reputation evolves, requiring further updating. An analyst who goes “too far” 
with optimistic bias should experience a decreased optimism-volume relation as investors decrease their reaction to 
that analyst’s overly optimistic forecasts. The analyst would then reduce optimism in the subsequent year.  
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the highest number of recommendations in I/B/E/S for the S&P 1500 firms. The inclusion of 18 
brokerage houses ensures that we examine both “bulge bracket” firms (i.e., the largest investment 
banks) and non-bulge firms. 
We obtain data for all 18 brokerage houses for the five years from 2011–2015, covering 
1,436 firms from the S&P 1500 list that have matching Bloomberg tickers and matching 
Compustat and CRSP identification codes.16 We obtain analyst 1-year-ahead earnings per share 
(EPS) forecasts, price targets, and recommendation data from I/B/E/S, using unadjusted files and 
adjusting for share splits, as appropriate, as well as stock price data from CRSP and firm 
characteristics from Compustat. There is a total of 179,417 analyst–firm–day observations that 
have a 1-year-ahead earnings forecast and all other required data.  
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics related to the 18 brokerages included in our sample, 
which cover a wide range in terms of brokerage trading activity, analyst employment and coverage, 
and investment banking activity. Panel A focuses on brokerage trading volume. The mean number 
of shares traded by a given brokerage ranges from 2.56 million to 3.76 billion shares. Panel B 
provides summary statistics on the number of analysts who are employed each year by the 
brokerage house and who provide 1-year-ahead EPS forecasts. 
Our sample selection methodology biases our sample towards brokerage houses that 
provide higher levels of overall analyst coverage. However, there is still significant variation in 
the size of brokerage houses’ sell-side research departments (Brokerage Size) included in our 
sample. The mean number of analysts at each brokerage ranges from 49 to 236 analysts, and the 
average number of stocks followed by the average analyst at each firm ranges from 6 to 17. 
                                                 
16 Bloomberg provides only five years of data at any given time. We were unable to obtain data earlier than 2011.  
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Finally, Table 1 Panel C provides the ratio of the number of shares traded through the given 
brokerage to the total brokerage net revenue for each year. The mean annual number of sample 
shares traded per dollar of revenue for each brokerage house ranges from 0.002 to 0.177 for the 
brokerages with non-missing revenue.17 Overall, our sample includes a wide range of brokerage 
houses that produce analyst research, although our sample is weighted towards larger firms. Our 
sample, by construction, excludes independent research firms. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in our tests (Panel A) and 
correlations between these variables (Panel B). The dependent variable used in our tests, Volume 
Share, is the total number of shares traded in a given stock through the brokerage house over the 
[−1, 5] day window, divided by the total number of shares traded in the given stock during the 
window, where day 0 is the day on which an analyst issues an earnings forecast. We include day 
−1, given the evidence in Juergens and Lindsey (2009) that analysts release reports to some 
customers before the official I/B/E/S estimate date; however, results are qualitatively similar using 
alternate windows [0, 1] and [0, 10].  Volume Share ranges from 0.005% to 25.21%, with a mean 
of 5.31% of shares traded in a firm by a particular brokerage over the 7-day window of interest.  
Optimism variables include Forecast Bias, Buy, Sell, and Target Optimism. The variable 
Forecast Bias is the rank (by deciles, scaled from 0 to 1) of the difference between the 1-year-
ahead earnings forecast, in earnings per share (EPS), and the actual value of EPS, normalized by 
the fiscal year-end share price. Higher Forecast Bias indicates a higher earnings forecast relative 
to other analysts who have issued forecasts for the same firm at the same time. The variable Buy 
                                                 
17 We were able to hand-collect revenue data for 17 out of the 18 brokerage houses. One of the privately owned 
brokerages in our sample did not provide revenue information in company statements or on the company website. 
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(Sell) is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the analyst issued a buy or strong buy (sell 
or strong sell) recommendation, and 0 otherwise. The variable Target Optimism is a ranked 
variable, ranging between 0 and 1, of the newly issued price target with a horizon equal to 12 
months, normalized by the prior trading day’s stock price. To avoid small denominators, we 
require that the stock price is greater than or equal to USD 5.  
The forecast quality variables used in our analyses include Current Accuracy, Herding, 
First, and Forecast Age. The variable Current Accuracy captures the relative accuracy of the 
forecast, following the ranking method of Hong and Kubik (2003) and the benchmark periods of 
Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006). The variable Herding is an indicator variable that takes the 
value 1 if a forecast falls between the analyst’s prior forecast and the consensus forecast, and 0 
otherwise. A herding forecast is likely to convey less new information to the market, and thus will 
have lower value (Gleason and Lee, 2003; Clement and Tse, 2005). The variable First is an 
indicator variable denoting the first forecast made by a particular analyst after the prior annual 
earnings announcement, and Forecast Age is the number of days before the next earnings 
announcement date that the forecast was made, divided by 365. Earlier forecasts (First = 1 and a 
higher Forecast Age) are likely to have higher value (Clement and Tse, 2003).  
The analyst quality variables include Prior Accuracy, # Forecasts, # Years Followed, # 
Firms Followed, and # Analysts Following. The variable Prior Accuracy is defined similarly to 
Current Accuracy, but Prior Accuracy uses the latest forecast made by the analyst in the [–90, 0] 
day window before the prior earnings announcement. The variables # Forecasts, # Years Followed, 
and # Firms Followed are relative-rank measures for the number of forecasts an analyst has made 
in the prior firm year, the number of years the analyst has followed the firm, and the number of 
firms the analyst follows in a given year, respectively. These variables are normalized to range 
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from 0 to 1, calculated on a stock–year basis as the value for the given analyst minus the minimum 
for all analysts, divided by the maximum minus the minimum for all analysts. All three are positive 
indicators of analyst quality. Higher # Forecasts indicates an analyst who is more active in 
updating research for the firm. Higher # Years Followed indicates more firm-specific experience. 
Last, # Firms Followed is a positive indicator of analyst quality, since covering more firms is likely 
to develop greater industry expertise (Leone and Wu, 2007). 18  We also include # Analysts 
Following, the total number of analysts who follow a firm in a given year, although it is not clear 
which directional effect to predict for # Analysts Following.19  
Table 2 Panel B reports correlations between the main variables. These correlations suggest 
that the variables capture distinct dimensions of optimism, forecast quality, and analyst quality.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Analyst and forecast characteristic effects on trading volume 
To assess whether analyst optimism affects the share of the total volume traded by the 
brokerage at the time of the analyst forecast, we estimate the following regression: 
Volume Shareijt = a0 + a1Optimismijt + a2Qualityijt + a3Analyst Qualityijt + eijt,             (1) 
                                                 
18 If our sample included very small brokerage houses and independent research firms, high # Firms Followed could 
be an indication of a firm that has few resources and is forced to stretch analysts into covering more firms. However, 
for our sample of larger banks, we find that the most experienced analysts cover the most firms. The correlation 
between experience and # Firms Followed is a statistically significant 0.1804, which is consistent with more 
experienced, more senior, and more respected analysts covering more firms.  
19 It may be the case that a firm followed by fewer analysts has less public information available. For such a firm, an 
individual analyst’s forecasts are likely to have higher value. Conversely, it may be the case that higher analyst 
following indicates more investor interest in the firm, thus analyst research is valuable to more investors and is more 
likely to drive incremental trading. Thus, we make no directional prediction for # Analysts Following, but we include 




for analyst i, covered firm j, at time t; where Optimism includes Forecast Bias, Buy, Sell, and 
Target Optimism; Quality includes Current Accuracy, Herding, First, and Forecast Age; and 
Analyst Quality includes Prior Accuracy, # Forecasts, # Years Followed, # Firms Followed, and 
# Analysts Following. We include all earnings forecast dates. Thus, a0 captures the effect analysts 
have on Volume Share purely from issuing a forecast.  
We include year fixed effects, brokerage fixed effects, and firm fixed effects in the model 
to control for time, brokerage, and firm effects on volume share. In particular, we might expect the 
brokerage share of trading volume to shift over time with consolidation in the industry. If there are 
also time trends in analyst behavior, we might erroneously find a relation between the two if we 
fail to control for year fixed effects. Brokerage firm fixed effects control for the overall size and 
market share of each brokerage firm, as well as other brokerage-specific characteristics such as 
resources, accuracy, or the number of analysts; which impact both analyst behavior and the broker 
share of trading volume.20 Finally, we include firm fixed effects (for the covered firm). Analysts 
compete with each other for volume in a given firm. Our use of brokerage share of trading volume, 
and our relative optimism variables helps to address this, but this may not fully adjust for firm-
specific effects. We also allow for arbitrary within-firm correlations in standard errors.21  
                                                 
20 In particular, there may be style differences which affect both analyst behavior and trading volume, but these are 
not due to analyst behavior driving trading volume (e.g., brokerage firm culture, client type, communication style), 
which is difficult to measure. Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006) state in their conclusion that brokerage house 
status and reputation likely explain some of the differences in optimism observed across brokerages in their sample. 
They also point out that analysts’ decisions to stop covering, rather than issuing more negative coverage, may differ 
systematically across brokerage houses. Including brokerage firm fixed effects allows us to control for this type of 
difference between brokerage houses.  
21 In addition to these fixed effects, we control for the informativeness of earnings forecasts when examining the 
relation between optimistic bias and volume share by including forecast and analyst quality variables together with 
optimism variables. We also test the robustness of our results to two other variables which may impact the 
informativeness of the forecast, but which do not capture forecast quality per se. In particular, first, a new forecast 
may be more informative to the market, and lead to higher overall trading volume (though not necessarily brokerage 
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The results are presented in Table 3. We find that, in Column 1, Volume Share is positively 
and significantly related to Forecast Bias (coefficient = 0.069, p-value < 0.05). An increase in 
Forecast Bias of 0.5, which is an increase from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the ranked 
variable, is associated with an increase in volume share of 0.035% of the shares traded. This is 
0.65% of the average forecast-window volume share. For a stock that has an average forecast 
estimate-window trading volume, this is an additional 6,194 shares traded over the 7-day window 
for an individual forecast. 
While additional assumptions are required to convert this to trading commissions, doing 
so can be a useful exercise to quantify the potential incentive towards optimistic bias. With a 
typical commission of USD 0.03 per share traded (Levine, 2015), the additional 6,194 shares result 
in an increase in commission of USD 186. While the per-forecast effect appears relatively small, 
the overall incentive can be large, given the frequency of forecast revisions. Multiplied by the 
number of forecasts (179,417), the potential incentive to increase forecast optimism by the 
interquartile range amounts to over USD 33 million, with all else equal.22  
                                                 
share of trading volume) if there are higher differences of opinion for the stock. In additional tests, we include an 
additional control variable for forecast dispersion to capture differences of opinion. We find an insignificant negative 
coefficient on forecast dispersion, and find that results reported in Table 3 remain qualitatively similar. Second, 
investment banking relationships can increase both the potential informativeness of the analyst’s forecast to the 
market, and the market’s perception of analyst bias. To examine whether investment banking relationships have a 
significant impact on our results, we focus on the subset of forecasts for which investment banking relationships are 
unlikely. We restrict to the subsample of brokerage houses with little or no investment banking business. The results 
reported in Table 3 remain qualitatively similar.   
22 Earlier papers use larger per-share or percentage commissions to estimate economic significance. Jeurgens and 
Lindsey (2009) cite commission rates ranging from USD 0.05 to USD 0.91 per share. Jackson (2005) uses a percentage 
commission that would amount to USD 0.075 per share for a stock trading at USD 50 per share. Applying the alternate 
commission rates used in Jeurgens and Lindsey (2009) to the results in Table 3, USD 0.05 per share implies a per-
forecast effect of USD 310, and USD 0.91 per share implies a per-forecast effect of USD 5,637.  
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We find the expected coefficients on the control variables for recommendation and target 
price optimism. Buy (sell) recommendations are positively (not) related to the broker share of 
volume (coefficient = 0.248, p-value < 0.001 for buy) and Target Optimism is positively and 
significantly related to Volume Share (coefficient = 0.148, p-value < 0.01).23,24 The combined 
effects of the intercept and slope terms imply that earnings forecasts with concurrent sell and hold 
(buy) recommendations experience lower (higher) Volume Share than earnings forecasts not 
associated with a concurrent recommendation. Similarly, earnings forecasts associated with 
pessimistic (optimistic) target price forecasts experience lower (higher) Volume Share than those 
which are not associated with concurrent target price forecast. 
Table 3 Column 2 presents the results for earnings forecast Quality. We find no significant 
relation between First and Volume Share. However Current Accuracy, Herding, and Forecast Age 
are significantly associated with Volume Share, in the expected directions. Column 3 presents the 
results for the effect of Analyst Quality. As expected, the analyst Prior Accuracy and # Years 
Followed are positively associated with Volume Share (coefficient = 0.196, p-value < 0.01 and 
coefficient = 0.211, p-value < 0.05, respectively). The variable # Analysts Following is negatively 
related to Volume Share (coefficient = −0.009, p-value < 0.1). However, we find no association 
between # Forecasts and # Firms Followed with Volume Share. 
                                                 
23 Given evidence in Juergens and Lindsay (2009) that downgrades are leaked to clients several days before the 
recommendation becomes public, we also examine the robustness of the optimism-volume relation using a wider 
window for Volume Share. Results for Forecast Bias are similar for [-3, 5], focusing more directly on the pre-forecast 
period, [-3, -1], or including both the pre-period and the immediate forecast window, [-3, 1].  
24 In additional analyses, we examine whether recent news events affect the bias-volume relation. We focus on the 
subset of earnings forecasts made in the five days following an earnings announcement, and partition based upon 
whether the earnings announcement is positive or negative, using both the earnings forecast error and the 
announcement-window 3-day return. We find significantly positive coefficients on Forecast Bias in three of the four 
subsamples, with no significant differences in coefficient between positive and negative news. Thus, preceding news 
does not appear to significantly impact the bias-volume relation. Conversely, we examine earnings forecasts which 
are isolated from other forecasts, suggesting no significant recent news has been released. Results are robust. 
 24 
 
Table 3 Column 4 presents the results, including optimism, forecast quality, and analyst 
quality in the same model. The results are relatively unchanged. We continue to find evidence that 
earnings forecast optimism leads to a larger brokerage share of volume, even after controlling for 
forecast and analyst quality. Similarly, quality is associated with volume, controlling for optimism. 
Volume Share is positively and significantly related to Forecast Bias, Current Accuracy, Forecast 
Age, Prior Accuracy, and # of Years Followed; and it is negatively and significantly related to # 
Analysts Following.25 These results provide evidence consistent with H1. They are also robust to 
a large set of additional robustness tests.26,27,28  Thus, we find a forecast-volume relation which 
provides a potential incentive towards optimistic bias as well as evidence of a potential incentive 
towards quality. In the remainder of Section 4, we report additional tests to more directly address 
                                                 
25 The effect of an interquartile-range increase in forecast bias is an increase in broker share of trading volume of 1.1% 
of the mean. Interquartile-range changes in forecast and analyst quality measures have similar or higher economic 
significance magnitudes, with the following: forecast accuracy, 1.3%, forecast age, 1.0%, prior-year forecast accuracy, 
2.2%, analyst stock-specific experience, 2.0%, and number of analysts covering the firm, -2.3%, of mean broker share 
of trading volume.  
26 The results in Table 3 show that within-broker variation in analyst forecast quality is related to variation in the 
broker’s share of trading volume surrounding the analyst’s forecast. We replicate Table 3, including analyst fixed 
effects rather than broker fixed effects, to examine within-analyst variation in forecast quality. We find similar results. 
All coefficients remain statistically significant at the 10% level or better, with magnitudes ranging from 85% to 115% 
of those reported in Table 3. Thus, the results reported in Table 3 and in Section 4.1 are robust to including analyst 
fixed effects.  
We also estimate Table 3 including only year and firm fixed effects (i.e., excluding both broker and analyst 
fixed effects). This better captures whether more optimistic analyst research is related cross-sectionally to a larger 
broker share of volume. Consistent with Jackson (2005), when not including brokerage fixed effects, we include an 
additional control variable for total brokerage firm volume in the given year, to adjust for the overall brokerage firm 
market share of trading. We find similar results. 
27 The results presented in Table 3 are robust to estimation using a fractional logit model instead of an ordinary least 
squares model. Focusing on Column 4, all coefficients on optimism and quality variables that are significant at the 
10% level or better remain significant using a fractional logit model, while no other coefficients are significant with 
the fractional logit. Thus, the results are robust to estimation using a fractional logit model. 
28 If forecasts cluster together in time, they may be associated with lower brokerage share of trading volume due to 
increased competition for volume during these forecast-cluster windows. We examine whether clustering has an 
impact on our results in two ways. First, we examine whether forecast optimism is a function of whether other forecasts 
occur during the [-5, 5] window, or a wider [-10, 10] window, surrounding the given forecast. We find no relation. 
Second, we replicate our main Table 3 tests including an indicator for whether the forecast is isolated. We find similar 
results when including an additional control variable for whether there are other forecasts in the [-5, 5] or [-10, 10] 
window surrounding the given forecast. 
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whether analysts have volume-related incentives to optimistically bias forecasts or to increase 
accuracy. 
4.2 Trading volume following an analyst’s move between brokerage houses 
The results presented above show that analyst forecast optimism and accuracy are 
associated with a larger broker share of trading volume. However, as with prior research for analyst 
recommendations, this does not establish a causal relationship between the analyst’s research and 
trading. To address whether the analyst drives the volume effect, we examine whether brokerage 
trading volume follows analysts who change brokerage houses. If so, the analyst, rather than other 
factors, drives the brokerage share of volume effects. It is more likely that brokerage houses 
consider trading volume in their hiring decisions, and it is more likely that analysts will thus be 
concerned with generating volume, if analysts are able to generate similar volume after a brokerage 
house moves.  
We limit our analysis to analysts who moved between brokerage houses within our sample 
between 2012 and 2015. We require that analysts spend at least one year in each of the brokerages 
and they cover at least one firm that is the same in both brokerage houses. We identify 58 analysts 
who moved between brokerages within our sample. Among these analysts, 45 (35) covered at least 
3 (5) of the same firms in both brokerage houses. We then estimate the following regression: 
Med. Volume Share New Brokerbjt = a0 + a1 Med. Volume Share Analystijt-1 + a2 Med. Volume 
Share New Brokerijt-1+ ebjt,     (2) 
where Med. Volume Shareijt is the median Volume Share from the analyst’s research dates in a 
given year t covering firm j after the move to the new brokerage house b, capturing the median 
trading volume that the analyst generates throughout the calendar year. The variable Med. Volume 
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Share Analystijt-1 is the analyst Volume Share covering firm j in year t−1 prior to the move to the 
new brokerage house. The variable Med. Volume Share New Brokerbjt-1 is the Volume Share of the 
new brokerage covering firm j in year t−1 before the analyst’s move. 
The results are presented in Table 4. Column 1 presents the results for the full sample. 
Column 2 (3) displays results when the analyst forecasted a minimum of 3 (5) of the same firms 
at both the old brokerage house and the new brokerage house. Our variable of interest, Med. 
Volume Share Analystit-1, is positively and significantly related to Med. Volume Shareit in each 
sample (coefficients between 0.120 and 0.147, p-value < 0.05).29 The magnitude ranges from 15% 
to 18% of the effect of the brokerage house trading volume in the previous year. This suggests that 
the new analyst causes an economically significant shift in broker volume share. These results 
suggest that analysts have a causal impact on the share of trading volume, and brokerage houses 
are likely to consider trading volume generation to be a transferrable analyst skill. 
4.3 Analyst Career Concerns 
The results thus far suggest that analysts have incentives to increase optimism and accuracy 
if they aim to increase trading volume to generate trading commissions for their brokerage houses. 
However, it is not clear whether analysts are rewarded for generating volume. While anecdotal 
and survey evidence suggests that analysts are compensated based partly on generating volume 
(see the discussion in Section 2.1), there is no large-sample empirical evidence regarding the effect 
of generating volume on analysts’ compensation or careers. 
                                                 
29 The results presented in Table 4 are robust to estimation using a fractional logit model instead of ordinary least 
squares model.  
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To examine this issue, we focus on analysts’ career moves. We employ a methodology 
similar to Hong and Kubik (2003) and examine whether an analyst’s moves across brokerage 
houses of varying statures are predicted by prior-year performance. Since our sample focuses on 
the largest brokerage houses and thus captures analysts who are already in strong positions, we 
focus on downwards career changes. In particular, we test whether there is a negative relation 
between the trading volume a given analyst generates and the likelihood that the analyst is demoted 
to a smaller brokerage house. We model analysts’ demotion from their employers using the 
following analyst–year logistic regression: 
Pr(Demotionit+1) = d0 + d1Med Volume Shareit + Controls + eit,  (3) 
where we use two different measures for Demotion. Consistent with Hong and Kubik (2003), we 
use brokerage house size, measured by the number of analysts it employs, as a proxy for prestige. 
The first measure, Demote1_NextYear, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if, in the 
following year, the analyst moves to a brokerage house that is smaller than the one she is currently 
employed by, and takes the value of 0 otherwise. The second measure, Demote2_NextYear takes 
the value of 1 if the analyst moves from one of the largest brokerage houses (i.e., a brokerage 
house that employs more than 25 analysts) to one of the smallest brokerage houses (i.e., one that 
employs fewer than 25 analysts), and takes the value of 0 otherwise. We estimate the model both 
with and without controls for other dimensions of analyst performance that may affect their career 
moves, including forecast accuracy, herding, and optimism.30  
                                                 
30 We observe a rate of demotions similar to Hong and Kubik (2003). In their data, roughly 1.5% of analyst–years 
include a move from a high-status to a low-status brokerage house (see Hong and Kubik, 2003, Table III, p. 321). In 
our sample, we find that 2.45% of analyst–years include a demotion to a smaller brokerage house, while 1.02% of the 
eligible analyst–years include a demotion from a “large” to a “small” brokerage house. 
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Table 5 presents the results of this analysis. We find that the volume share that the analyst 
creates is significantly and negatively associated with analyst demotions in all specifications. If an 
analyst generates more trading volume with her research, she is less likely to move to a lower-
status brokerage house in the following year. This remains true using either measure of demotion 
and with or without controls for forecast and analyst quality and optimism.31 This creates a clear 
incentive, above and beyond any compensation related to trading commissions, for analysts to act 
strategically to increase trading volume.  
4.4 Strategic bias 
 The results described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 suggest that forecast optimism and accuracy 
creates trading volume, and the results reported in Section 4.3 indicate that analysts have an 
incentive to generate volume. In this section, we test whether analysts strategically bias their 
forecasts and/or strategically modify their accuracy with the goal of generating trading volume. If 
an analyst is more (less) successful in generating trading volume with more optimistic forecasts, 
then she should be more (less) likely to issue optimistically biased forecasts in the future to 
generate trading volume. Similarly, if an analyst is more (less) successful in generating trading 
volume with more accurate forecasts, then she should be more (less) likely to engage in additional 
effort to issue more accurate forecasts. We use Forecast Bias (Current Accuracy) as the dependent 
                                                 
31 Hong and Kubik (2003) find that bottom 10% relative forecast accuracy is positively (negatively) predictive of 
analysts moving to a lower-status (higher-status) brokerage house. Groysberg, Healy, and Maber (2011) find that 
analysts who move from the high-status investment bank they examine to a lower-status bank or exit I/B/E/S had 
lower prior-year forecast accuracy. While the coefficient on Med. Current Accuracy in Table 6 is insignificant, we 
find similar results to Hong and Kubik (2003) and Groysberg, Healy, and Maber (2011) under certain specifications—
e.g., raking analysts over a wider time period, such as [−360, −90] or [−360, −30]. Thus, in our sample, the relation 
between analyst forecast accuracy and demotion is sensitive to the definition of forecast accuracy used. The coefficient 
on Med. Analyst Volume remains positive and statistically significant at the 5% level or better in all such variations.  
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variable, and we examine whether forecast bias (accuracy) in one year is related to the analyst-
specific optimism (accuracy)–volume sensitivity from the prior year, while controlling for analyst-
specific accuracy (optimism)–volume sensitivity from the prior year. 
 We limit our analysis to analysts who have a minimum of two years of data within our 
sample between the years 2011 and 2015. We also require that the analyst issued at least 30 
forecasts in a given year to all firms she covered. This restriction allows for a more reliable estimate 
in the first stage, with a minimum of 30 observations for each regression. In the first stage, we 
estimate the following regressions for each analyst–year pair: 
Volume Shareijt = a0 + a1Forecast Biasijt + a2Current Accuracyijt + eijt.     (4a) 
 The first stage measures how much trading volume each analyst was able to create using 
forecast bias and forecast accuracy. In the second stage, we use the analyst–year 𝑎 1 and 𝑎 2 
coefficients estimated in the first stage, and we test whether analysts who have experienced 
optimism (accuracy) yielding higher trading volume are more optimistic (accurate) in the 
subsequent year. Conversely, we test whether analysts who have experienced optimism (accuracy) 
failing to generate trading volume are less optimistic (accurate). The second stage is estimated 
using the following pooled regression: 
Forecast Bias (Accuracy)ijt+1 = b0 + b1*𝑎1it + b2*𝑎2it + eijt+1.     (4b) 
 A significantly positive coefficient on b1 indicates that the analyst is strategically updating 
optimistic bias – becoming more (less) optimistic if optimism has been more (less) successful in 
generating volume in the prior year. A significantly positive coefficient on b2 has a similar 
implication for accuracy. The results of the second stage regression are reported in Table 6. The 
results in Panel A (B) examine whether forecast bias (accuracy) in one year is related to the analyst-
specific optimism (accuracy)–volume sensitivity from the prior year. Column 1 presents results in 
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which we limit the sample in the first stage to analyst–years in which the analyst issued at least 30 
forecasts. In Panel A, we can see that the coefficient on our variable of interest, 𝑎1it, is positive 
(0.001) and statistically significant at the 5% level in Column 1. Columns 2–4 present the results 
when we limit the sample in the first stage to analyst–years in which the analyst issued at least 50–
100 forecasts. These more stringent restrictions serve two purposes. First, they increase the 
reliability of the estimation of the analysis. Second, they increase the likelihood that the analyst 
faces a large enough sample to learn and thus adjust behavior. Thus, both econometrically and 
conceptually, we expect a greater capacity to detect strategic updating behavior when restricting 
our sample to analyst–years that contain more forecasts. The results are consistent with this. Panel 
A, Column 4, shows the strongest effect. The coefficient on 𝑎1it is equal to 0.01 and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The results show that optimism is increasing in prior-year optimism–
volume sensitivity, suggesting that analysts strategically update their forecast optimism.32   
 The results from the analysis of the effects of past accuracy creating trading volume on 
future accuracy are presented in Panel B. The coefficient of our variable of interest, 𝑎2it, is not 
statistically significant across any of the specifications. These results suggest that analysts are 
unable or unwilling to create more accurate forecasts even when more accurate forecasts in the 
prior year created trading volume. This is consistent with it requiring significantly more resources, 
time, effort, and access to management to increase accuracy than to increase optimism. It may be 
that analysts are unable to update accuracy significantly in a single year’s time, or it may be that 
the volume-related reward is insufficient to incentivize such an update.  
                                                 
32 Results presented in Panel A (B) control for prior-year volume-accuracy (volume-optimism) sensitivity. However 
volume-optimism and volume-accuracy sensitivity are negatively correlated at the analyst-year level – analysts who 
experience higher rewards to optimism typically experience lower rewards to accuracy. To ensure that this negative 





We examine the potential conflict of interest derived from one of the primary funding 
mechanisms for modern sell-side security analysis: brokerage trading commissions. We find that 
optimism in earnings forecasts is associated with a higher brokerage share of trading volume, even 
after controlling for forecast and analyst quality, recommendations, and target prices. This 
statistically and economically significant association is consistent with an analyst’s incentive to 
optimistically bias her research, which is also consistent with the theoretical predictions of Beyer 
and Guttman (2011). However, we also find that forecast and analyst quality are associated with a 
larger brokerage share of trading volume, with similar economic magnitudes for the effects of 
optimism and quality.  
We address whether analysts drive the increased brokerage share of volume by examining 
analyst moves across brokerage houses. We find that when an analyst changes brokerage houses, 
the new brokerage house earns a brokerage trading volume that is consistent with the analyst 
having a causal effect on the broker’s share of volume.  
Furthermore, we examine analysts’ incentives to generate volume by examining their 
career progress. We find that analysts who generate more trading volume for their brokerage 
houses are less likely to move to a lower-status firm in the subsequent year. Failure to generate 
volume increases the likelihood of demotion to a lower-status brokerage house. Thus, analysts are 
incentivized to generate trading volume even if they are not directly compensated for it.  
Finally, we examine whether analysts strategically update their optimism and accuracy in 
response to volume-generation incentives. We find that analysts become more (less) optimistic if 
their prior-year experience demonstrated that optimism is more (less) successful at generating 
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volume, consistent with strategic updating of optimism. However we find no evidence for strategic 
updating of accuracy.  
Taken together, our evidence points to a conflict of interest that can at least partially explain 
analysts’ optimistic earnings forecasts. This paper is relevant for researchers in accounting, 
finance, and economics, as our findings speak to the incentives of sell-side analysts whose research 
impacts stock prices, investor behavior, and the information environment of firms. Our results also 
speak to a more general issue: the potential disciplining effect of incentives generated by customer 
behavior. The link between analyst research and trading volume is not automatic; it is decided by 
brokerage house customers (i.e., investors). Certain features of these customers (in this case, risk 
aversion and short sale constraints) can lead to incentives towards bias. However, customers also 
have the power to reward quality and thus incentivize analysts to produce valuable research. This 
tension between incentives towards bias and incentives towards quality will likely be found in 
other settings in which customers choose how to reward service providers.  
Last, these results have relevance for current policy questions in the era of MiFID II. We 
can measure only the direct trading volume around an analyst’s research; therefore, the full 
economic magnitude of commissions-related incentives is likely even larger than the measurement 
we find in this study. Our findings also lend some credence to institutional investors’ claims that 
commissions currently serve as an incentive for brokerage houses to produce high-quality research, 
given the results for our forecast and analyst quality variables, however this incentive may not be 
sufficient to drive analyst behavior. The impact of MiFID II unbundling on incentives towards 
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
Volume Share Variables 
 
Volume Share  The sum of the share volume traded in firm j over the [−1, 5] trading-
day window by brokerage k divided by the sum of the total number of 
shares traded in firm j over the same [−1, 5] trading-day window, 
multiplied by 100. [(sum daily brokerage volume over [−1, 5] ÷ sum 
total volume over [−1, 5]) × 100]. Day 0 is the day the analyst issued 
her research. 
Med. Volume Share 
Analyst 
 The median Volume Share (as defined above) for analyst i in year t 
covering firm j.  
Med. Volume Share 
New Broker 
 The median Volume Share (as defined above) for broker b in year t 
covering firm j.  




Forecast Bias = (EPS Forecast i,j,t – EPS Actual j,t) ÷ Price j,t; EPS Forecast i,j,t is 
analyst i’s forecast at time t for company j. This forecast is then 
compared to actual EPS. This difference is divided by the price per 
share for company j at the end of fiscal year t. The measure is ranked 
into 10 deciles between 0 and 1 for all analysts covering firm j in year 
t. 
Buy = Indicator variable that receives the value of 1 if the analyst issued a 
strong buy or a buy recommendation, and 0 otherwise. 
Sell = Indicator variable that receives the value of 1 if the analyst issued a 
strong sell or a sell recommendation, and 0 otherwise. 
Target Optimism = Price target of analyst i for company j divided by the prior trading 
day’s price. The measure is ranked into 10 deciles between 0 and 1 for 
all analysts covering firm j in year t. 
Ind_Forecast  Indicator variable that receives the value of 1 if analyst i issued an 
EPS forecast for company j, and 0 otherwise. 
Ind_Rec = Indicator variable that receives the value of 1 if analyst i issued a 
recommendation for company j, and 0 otherwise. 
Ind_Target = Indicator variable that receives the value of 1 if analyst i issued a target 





Forecast Quality Variables 
 
Current Accuracy  |(EPS Forecast i,j,t – EPS Actual j,t)| ÷ Price j,t; The measure is ranked 
separately for three different time horizons: [0, 90], [91, 180], and 
more than 180 days until the earnings announcement. Following Hong 
and Kubik (2003), the measure is divided by 100, to range between 0 
and 1 as follows: {100 – [(rank – 1) ÷ (number of analysts – 1)] × 
100} ÷ 100. The measure uses all forecasts made for firm j in year t in 
each of the three different time horizons. 
Herding 
 
= Indicator variable that receives the value of 1 for forecasts that are 
between the analyst’s own prior forecast and the consensus forecast 
(the consensus is calculated as the median outstanding forecast for 




= Indicator variable that receives the value of 1 for the first EPS forecast 
made by analyst i for company j in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
Forecast Age 
 
= The number of days the EPS forecast/target/recommendation was 
made before the closest earnings announcement date, divided by 365. 
 
Analyst Quality Variables 
 
Prior Accuracy  Calculated similarly to Current Accuracy, but using the latest forecast 
made in the [−90, 0] day window before the earnings announcement 
for year t−1. 
# Forecasts = The number of forecasts issued by analyst i following firm j in year 
t−1 minus the minimum number of forecasts issued by analysts who 
follow firm j in year t−1, with this difference scaled by the range of the 
number of forecasts issued by analysts who follow firm j in year t−1. 
# Years Followed = A measure of analyst i’s firm-specific experience. It is calculated as 
the number of years of firm-specific experience for analyst i following 
firm j in year t−1, minus the minimum number of years of firm-specific 
experience for analysts who follow firm j in year t−1, with this 
difference scaled by the range of years of firm-specific experience for 
analysts who follow firm j in year t−1. 
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# Firms Followed = A measure of the number of companies that analyst i follows in year 
t−1. It is calculated as the number of companies followed by analyst i 
following firm j in year t−1, minus the minimum number of companies 
followed by analysts who follow firm j in year t−1, with this difference 
scaled by the range in the number of companies followed by the 
analysts who follow firm j in year t−1. 
# Analysts Following = The number of analysts who cover firm j at time t−1. 
 
Brokerage Statistics 
   
Sum Volume = The sum of the daily volume of shares traded by brokerage k in year t, 
in billions. 
Brokerage Size = Number of analysts employed by brokerage k in year t. 
Percent of 
Underwriting 
= The ratio of the total dollar amount of US equity underwriting deals a 
brokerage participated in year t to the total dollar volume of US equity 
offerings (as reported by Bloomberg) in year t, multiplied by 100. 
 
Shares per Revenue 
Dollar 
 The ratio of the total number of shares traded by a brokerage divided 
by the total net revenue of the brokerage in year t. 
 
Analyst Demotion Variables 
   
Demote1_Next Year = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the analyst moved from a larger to a 
smaller brokerage in the following year, and 0 otherwise. 
Demote2_Next Year = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the analyst moved from a brokerage 
with greater than or equal to 25 analysts to one with less than 25 
analysts in a given year, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 1. Brokerage Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Brokerage-specific trading volume 
 Total Share Volume Traded (in millions) 
Brokerage 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Mean Std. Dev. 
1 3,518.96  3,968.92   3,960.81   4,062.82   3,302.94   3,762.89   332.65  
2  3,194.20   2,292.88   3,026.30   3,366.51   2,380.38   2,852.05   486.63  
3  3,136.17   2,903.73   2,801.48   2,618.73   2,457.70   2,783.56   260.98  
4  2,543.33   2,251.41   2,280.61   2,021.63   1,880.43   2,195.48   255.37  
5  2,059.29   2,518.29   1,625.95   1,322.08   950.45   1,695.21   614.15  
6  1,545.63   1,958.61   1,810.29   1,669.09   1,643.30   1,725.38   161.11  
7  1,070.93   1,902.23   1,320.79   1,413.80   2,024.77   1,546.50   403.11  
8  2,035.32   1,531.46   1,365.64   1,223.04   995.52   1,430.19   391.30  
9  1,370.62   1,190.26   1,209.46   1,124.09   1,124.55   1,203.79   100.84  
10  405.86   439.87   336.93   325.04   319.26   365.39   54.20  
11  215.69   261.43   319.52   338.18   475.80   322.13   98.61  
12  93.01   108.92   155.21   152.00   140.64   129.96   27.59  
13  169.42   181.46   206.23   117.84   100.16   155.02   44.50  
14  101.42   98.67   120.17   85.29   80.20   97.15   15.64  
15  66.55   101.58   121.39   94.14   84.90   93.71   20.27  
16  71.33   126.03   111.57   103.16   60.61   94.54   27.59  
17  5.49   9.46   3.69   79.60   90.95   37.84   43.54  
18  2.78   3.13   2.80   2.60   1.49   2.56   0.63  
 
Panel A displays the total number of shares traded by each brokerage of all 1,436 sample firms in each year in the sample period, as well as the mean and standard 




Table 1. Brokerage Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 
Panel B. Number of analysts by brokerage 
        Average # of Stocks 
 Brokerage Size (# of analysts)  Followed by Analysts 
Brokerage 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Mean  at Each Brokerage 
1  233   232   243   241   231   236    6  
2  107   112   136   169   169   139    8  
3  125   126   96   79   78   101    7  
4  129   117   114   118   116   119    10  
5  93   90   85   90   82   88    12  
6  111   105   103   117   115   110    10  
7  122   117   145   199   187   154    9  
8  78   91   91   93   92   89    12  
9  116   110   103   112   178   124    9  
10  92   95   100   110   123   104    10  
11  100   81   90   117   133   104    10  
12  64   68   70   76   83   72    14  
13  88   103   83   78   74   85    13  
14  49   51   50   55   42   49    15  
15  110   134   115   101   99   112    11  
16  44   42   39   41   52   44    17  
17  33   30   43   67   67   48    10  
18  75   85   92   84   59   79    10  
 
Panel B displays the number of analysts associated with each brokerage as well as the mean number of analysts at each brokerage over the sample period. The last 
column displays the average number of stocks followed by all analysts at each brokerage house during the sample period. Amounts are extracted from I/B/E/S and 
are not restricted to the analysts in our final sample.  
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Table 1. Brokerage Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 
Panel C. Brokerage Revenue Breakdown 
Shares Traded per Dollar of Revenue 
Brokerage 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Mean 
1 0.038 0.048 0.045 0.048 0.040 0.044 
2 0.114 0.087 0.104 0.127 0.099 0.106 
3 0.106 0.104 0.090 0.092 0.080 0.094 
4 0.147 0.124 0.067 0.059 0.056 0.090 
5 0.050 0.074 0.040 0.037 0.027 0.046 
6 0.048 0.075 0.056 0.049 0.047 0.055 
7 0.011 0.020 0.014 0.015 0.022 0.016 
8 0.064 0.050 0.041 0.037 0.029 0.044 
9 0.034 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.031 
10 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.013 
11 0.084 0.085 0.108 0.113 0.192 0.116 
12 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
13 0.122 0.114 0.105 0.053 0.043 0.087 
14 0.110 0.103 0.112 0.071 0.062 0.092 
15 0.020 0.027 0.027 0.019 0.016 0.022 
16 0.165 0.258 0.213 0.159 0.090 0.177 
17 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 
18 . . . . . . 
 
Panel C displays the ratio of shares traded by each brokerage of all 1,436 sample firms in each year in the sample period to yearly total brokerage revenue, as well 




Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics  
Variable    N Mean Std. Dev. Min p25 Median p75 Max 
Volume Share 179,417  5.311 5.016 0.005 1.217 4.246 7.678 25.207 
Optimism         
Forecast Bias 179,417  0.502 0.312 0 0.222 0.556 0.778 1 
Buy 179,417  0.030 0.170 0 0 0 0 1 
Sell 179,417  0.006 0.078 0 0 0 0 1 
Target Optimism 73,913  0.503 0.305 0 0.222 0.556 0.778 1 
Ind_Rec 179,417  0.067 0.251 0 0 0 0 1 
Ind_Target 179,417  0.414 0.493 0 0 0 1 1 
Forecast Quality         
Current Accuracy 179,241  0.506 0.295 0 0.25 0.506 0.761 1 
Herding 142,908  0.428 0.495 0 0 0 1 1 
First 179,417  0.223 0.417 0 0 0 0 1 
Forecast Age 179,417  0.551 0.292 0 0.288 0.537 0.789 1.501 
Analyst Quality         
Prior Accuracy 92,249  0.513 0.307 0 0.25 0.5 0.773 1 
# Forecasts 129,611  0.540 0.287 0 0.333 0.524 0.75 1 
# Years Followed 126,443  0.385 0.336 0 0.095 0.30 0.625 1 
# Firms Followed 129,856  0.473 0.271 0 0.278 0.452 0.655 1 
# Analysts Following 177,237  21.625 9.112 1 15 21 27 57 
Brokerage House Characteristics        
Sum Volume 179,417  1.554 1.178 0.001 0.318 1.529 2.290 4.041 
Brokerage Size 179,417  114.098 44.864 30 90 107 118 243 
Percent of Underwriting 179,417  6.699 4.089 0 2.181 7.993 10.132 14.014 
Shares per Revenue Dollar 178,885  0.062 0.045 0 0.028 0.050 0.092 0.258 
Med. Analyst Volume 179,417  4.600 3.734 0.005 1.043 4.345 6.402 25.207 




Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 












































1 Volume Share 1 0.017* -0.006 0.034* -0.043* 0.005 -0.016* -0.036* 0.016* 0.005 0.048* 0.012 -0.010 -0.079* 
2 Forecast Bias 0.014* 1 0.013* -0.028* 0.066* 0.031* -0.002 -0.013 0.100* 0.034* 0.005 -0.011 0.002 0.001 
3 Buy 0.016* 0.014* 1 -0.019* 0.138* -0.013* -0.012 0.060* -0.003 0.000 -0.008 0.004 0.001 -0.002 
4 Sell 0.019* -0.024* -0.014* 1 -0.109* -0.018* -0.022* 0.010 -0.009 -0.005 0.008 -0.013 -0.008 -0.020* 
5 Target Optimism -0.019* 0.087* 0.173* -0.122* 1 0.001 -0.006 -0.023* -0.022* 0.015* -0.010 0.033* 0.024* 0.026* 
6 Current Accuracy -0.011* 0.041* -0.018* -0.010* 0.010* 1 -0.052* -0.002 -0.038* 0.035* -0.019* 0.002 0.002 0.001 
7 Herding -0.006* 0.015* -0.021* -0.015* -0.001 -0.037* 1 0.008 -0.041* -0.014* -0.005 -0.012 0.019* -0.026* 
8 First -0.003 0.014* 0.135* 0.027* -0.013* -0.146* -0.001 1 0.049* 0.003 0.002 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 
9 Forecast Age 0.003 0.076* -0.029* -0.019* -0.028* -0.134* -0.016* 0.468* 1 0.008 0.022* -0.004 -0.006 -0.020* 
10 Prior Accuracy 0.007* 0.027* -0.002 -0.006 0.016* 0.034* -0.011* -0.004 -0.007* 1 0.010 -0.002 -0.015* -0.008 
11 # Forecasts 0.013* 0.002 -0.014* 0 -0.003 -0.012* -0.011* -0.043* -0.001 0.009* 1 0.168* 0.086* -0.082* 
12 # Years Followed -0.0002 -0.011* 0.003 -0.007* 0.027* -0.000 -0.008* 0.006* 0.007* -0.000 0.113* 1 0.213* 0.008 
13 # Firms Followed -0.010* -0.003 0.001 -0.006* 0.014* -0.003 0.006 -0.007* 0.008* -0.020* 0.072* 0.180* 1 -0.033* 
14 
# Analysts 
Following -0.070* -0.002 -0.034* -0.017* -0.000 0.000 -0.018* -0.046* -0.018* 0.010* -0.035* -0.056* -0.075* 1 
 
Panel B displays the Pearson (Spearman Rank) correlation coefficients below (above) the diagonal. The asterisks represent correlations significant at the 5% 




Table 3. Effect of Analyst Characteristics on Brokerage Share of Trading Volume 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Optimism Forecast Quality Analyst Quality All Characteristics 
          
Forecast Bias 0.069**   0.102** 
 [2.32]   [2.05] 
Buy x Ind_Rec 0.248***   0.146 
 [3.30]   [0.99] 
Sell x Ind_Rec -0.011   -0.286 
 [-0.09]   [-1.27] 
Target Optimism x Ind_Target 0.148***   0.082 
 [2.62]   [0.92] 
Ind_Rec -0.124**   0.038 
 [-2.52]   [0.39] 
Ind_Target -0.061*   0.011 
 [-1.67]   [0.19] 
Current Accuracy  0.070*  0.143** 
  [1.92]  [2.57] 
Herding  -0.034*  -0.037 
  [-1.69]  [-1.28] 
First  0.031  -0.077 
  [0.60]  [-0.81] 
Forecast Age  0.128***  0.114** 
  [3.32]  [1.98] 
Prior Accuracy   0.196*** 0.226*** 
   [2.73] [3.04] 
# Forecasts   0.025 0.032 
   [0.25] [0.31] 
# Years Followed   0.211** 0.224** 
   [2.49] [2.57] 
# Firms Followed   0.020 0.029 
   [0.17] [0.23] 
# Analysts Following   -0.009* -0.010* 
   [-1.81] [-1.93] 
Constant 11.862*** 11.764*** 11.671*** 11.391*** 
 [122.63] [108.12] [60.48] [54.56] 
     
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Broker FE Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 179,417 142,805 72,202 60,468 
Adj. R-squared 0.476 0.480 0.500 0.502 
Table 3 displays the results of ordinary least squares regressions, relating Volume Share to analyst optimism variables 
(Column 1), forecast quality variables (Column 2), and analyst quality variables (Column 3), for dates on which an 
earnings forecast is issued. Column 4 displays the results of all characteristics. Appendix A contains detailed 
descriptions of the variables. t-statistics are provided in parentheses, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. 




Table 4. Trading Volume Following an Analyst Move between Brokerage Houses 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 All Obs. Min 3 Firms Covered Min 5 Firms Covered 
        
Med. Volume Share Analystijt-1 0.139** 0.120** 0.147** 
 [2.61] [2.45] [2.46] 
Med. Volume Share New Brokerbjt-1 0.816*** 0.814*** 0.840*** 
 [7.88] [7.81] [7.52] 
Constant -0.943 -0.840 -1.192 
 [-1.05] [-1.00] [-1.36] 
    
Year FE Y Y Y 
Broker FE Y Y Y 
Observations 371 354 319 
Adj. R-squared 0.609 0.646 0.660 
Table 4 examines a sample of analysts’ moves between brokerage houses and whether Volume Share follows the 
analyst from the old brokerage to the new brokerage. The table displays the results of ordinary least squares 
regressions, relating Volume Share of firm j covered by analyst i in year t to the analyst Volume Share in year t−1 
before the move and to the Volume Share of the new brokerage b covering firm j in year t−1. Column 1 displays the 
results of all observations. Column 2 (3) displays results when the analyst forecasted a minimum of 3 (5) firms in both 
the old brokerage and the new brokerage house. Appendix A contains detailed descriptions of the variables. t-statistics 
are provided in parentheses, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 





Table 5. Analyst Volume and Subsequent Demotion 










Med. Analyst Volume -0.0825** -0.0806** -0.180** -0.180** 
 [-2.330] [-2.282] [-2.088] [-2.028] 
Med. Current Accuracy  -0.641  -1.151 
  [-1.155]  [-1.126] 
Med. # Forecasts  -0.293  -0.868 
  [-0.889]  [-1.216] 
Avg. Herding  -0.587*  -0.425 
  [-1.650]  [-0.695] 
Avg. First  0.197  -0.671 
  [0.263]  [-0.477] 
Med. # Firms Followed  0.0433  0.527 
  [0.146]  [1.265] 
Med. Forecast Bias  0.342  0.458 
  [0.496]  [0.662] 
Constant -2.882*** -2.433*** -2.429*** -1.545 
 [-16.66] [-5.275] [-4.978] [-1.282] 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Brokerage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,705 4,705 4,375 4,375 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0568 0.0594 0.0642 0.0714 
 
Table 5 displays the results of logistic regressions of indicator variables for demotion, Demote1_NextYear and 
Demote2_NextYear, on Med. Analyst Volume and a set of control variables. Demote1_NextYear takes the value 1 if 
the analyst moved to a smaller brokerage house in the following year, and 0 otherwise. Demote2_NextYear takes the 
value 1 if the analyst was in a large brokerage house (25 or more analysts) in the current year and moved to a small 
brokerage house (25 or fewer analysts) in the following year. All median or average variables are calculated on an 
analyst–year basis. Appendix A contains detailed descriptions of the variables. z-statistics are provided in parentheses, 
with standard errors clustered at the broker level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 




Table 6. The Effect of Analyst Past Success in Creating Trading by Optimism and Accuracy on 
Analyst Future Optimism and Accuracy 
Panel A. Optimism 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Min of 30 Obs. Min of 50 Obs. Min of 80 Obs. Min of 100 Obs. 
          
?̂?1it 0.001** 0.002** 0.003** 0.010*** 
 [2.20] [2.19] [2.16] [4.17] 
?̂?2it 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001 0.003 
 [3.39] [2.28] [0.84] [1.32] 
Constant 0.503*** 0.503*** 0.508*** 0.508*** 
 [525.73] [376.01] [191.74] [137.89] 
     
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 108,047 80,861 38,969 21,717 
Adj. R-squared 0.000159 0.000132 0.000256 0.00128 
 
Panel B. Accuracy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Min of 30 Obs. Min of 50 Obs. Min of 80 Obs. Min of 100 Obs. 
          
?̂?1it -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.004 
 [-0.43] [-0.41] [0.37] [-1.40] 
?̂?2it -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.002 
 [-0.12] [-0.04] [0.59] [0.99] 
Constant 0.501*** 0.498*** 0.498*** 0.497*** 
 [321.96] [258.01] [144.04] [104.15] 
     
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 107,961 80,797 38,939 21,711 
Adj. R-squared 0.000217 0.000313 0.000421 0.000353 
 
Table 6 displays the results of the second stage of a two-stage least squares regression. The first stage tests whether the 
analyst can create trading volume from optimism and accuracy in their earnings forecasts. The regression is of the form 
Volume Shareijt = a0 + a1Forecast Biasijt + a2Current Accuracyijt + eijt, and is estimated for each analyst–year, yielding an 
analyst–year specific estimate of ?̂?1it and ?̂?2it. We limit the sample to analyst–years for which the number of forecasts 
available to estimate the first-stage regression is at least 30, 50, 80, and 100 in Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The 
second stage tests whether the analyst has learned that optimism (accuracy) yields trading volume and becomes more 
optimistic (accurate) as a result. The results are presented in Panel A (B). The regression is of the form Forecast Bias 
(Accuracy)ijt+1 = b0 + b1*?̂?1it + b2*?̂?2it + eijt+1, and is estimated across all analysts. t-statistics are provided in parentheses, 
with standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
